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Summary 
The Belarusian economy will face two major challenges in the very near future. On the one 
hand, the economy will need considerable amounts of natural gas for internal consumption and 
for transit to third countries. Hence, it is crucial that the gas sector work safely and efficiently. 
On the other hand, Russia’s and Belarus’ intentions to join the WTO will make it unlikely that 
prices of future gas imports will decline from their current levels, since WTO membership will 
make it difficult to continue subsidizing energy – as has been the practice to-date. The current 
upward price pressure is likely to remain, resulting in increased costs to of gas enterprises and 
final consumers. Since the costs borne by most of producers are already high it will be difficult 
to fully cover the additional gas price increases with increased final prices. The advantage 
provided by the very low import prices during 2002-2003, was insufficiently used for the 
maintenance of existing assets and went instead into investments in social projects. Moreover, 
the current inefficient structure of the sector does not reward initiative or efficiency. 
The expected price increases could, however, be partially offset if the Belarusian gas sector 
would improve its efficiency of operations. Such improvements will, however, depend on 
reforms and on significant amounts of investment. In order to be attractive to private 
investors, the gas sector will need to be corporatized and opened for competition. The situation 
in the gas sector would be improved by reforms that reward efficiency increases and create 
attractive investment opportunities for the private sector, without the need to privatize the 
state-owned enterprises within “Beltransgas” and “Beltopgas”.  Some of the major concrete 
steps we consider to be necessary are price reform, the implementation of “regulated 




1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 2 
2. The relevance of enterprise restructuring and lessons from European counties .................. 2 
3. The gas sector in Belarus........................................................................................... 3 
3.1. The Joint Stock Company “Beltransgas” ................................................................. 4 
3.2. The “Beltopgas” Concern...................................................................................... 5 
3.3. Tariff policy and sector regulation.......................................................................... 5 
3.4. Resume............................................................................................................. 7 
4. Directions for reforms and gas sector restructuring ....................................................... 7 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations..................................................................... 9 
Appendix .................................................................................................................. 11 
 2
1. Introduction 
Natural gas plays a crucial role in the Belarusian economy. With the availability of Russian 
natural gas at comparatively low prices during recent years, the share of gas in the energy 
balance of Belarus has increased from 43% in 1990 to 60% in 2003. Although it is expected 
that the share of natural gas within the total primary energy consumption will decrease again 
below 50%, general gas consumption is still projected to remain at the fairly high level of 
around 17 bcm.1 
Since Russia intends to join the WTO, it is obvious that prices for imported gas will increase, 
because the WTO accession rules require Russia to increase its domestic prices2 and to apply 
an equal-price policy vis-à-vis all gas-importing countries (so that prices differ only due to 
differing transportation costs). Hence, with an expected modest rise of world market prices for 
gas during the next two decades, Belarusian gas consumers are well advised to prepare for 
further increases of the domestic gas prices.3 Naturally, this will have serious consequences for 
the international competitiveness of Belarusian enterprises. 
The Belarusian gas industry operates at low efficiency levels and definitely needs further 
investment. To improve the situation most gas enterprises need to be corporatized, an 
independent regulator needs to be established, and some elements of competition need to be 
introduced. Once these measures have been put in place, the gas industry should be able to 
operate on a sustainable basis and to attract private investment. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the CEE experience in gas 
sector restructuring. The present status of the Belarusian gas sector and its problems will be 
discussed in the third section. The forth section describes the current tariff setting situation 
within the systems of “Beltransgas” and “Beltopgas”. The fifth section revues possible 
approaches to gas sector reform in Belarus, and the last section contains conclusions and 
policy recommendations. 
2. The relevance of enterprise restructuring and lessons from European counties 
Typically, the energy sectors (gas and electricity) in Western Europe had for a long time been 
structured as large vertically and horizontally integrated monopolies with a significant share of 
state ownership. Only recently were various models implemented, designed to stimulate 
competition and reduce energy prices for final consumers. For example, following the adoption 
of the Single European Market principle in 1985, the European Commission considered the 
possibility of creating a single internal market for energy. The goal was to establish a set of 
common rules for the production, transmission and distribution of gas and electricity in order 
to reduce the market power of the existing local companies and to encourage competition. 
On the gas market, the EU now seeks to establish basic elements of competition such as free 
access for all gas-supplying companies to the transmission networks at equal tariffs, the 
unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution activities (to avoid opportunities for 
cross-subsidization), and the right of consumers to choose the cheapest supplier. The main 
motivation behind all these efforts was the experience of the United Kingdom, where the 
introduction of such rules at an earlier time had led to significantly lower energy prices and 
higher levels of competition than in all other EU countries. 
10 years ago most CEE countries faced severe problems within their state-owned gas sectors. 
First of all, they were largely inefficient, as state enterprises typically lack incentives and the 
authority to work efficiently, and to invest in long-term projects. On the contrary, most were 
more interested in current consumption. Secondly, for a long time most gas sector enterprises 
in the CEE relied on direct subsidies (e.g. government financing of many expenditures and 
investments) or indirect support (e.g. preferential credits, tax deferments, etc.). This created 
an unclear structure of incentives and led to considerable distortions on the commodity and 
factor markets. Thirdly, selected enterprises or groups of consumers were subsidized, either 
within a branch system of government subsidies, or through cross-subsidized tariffs, which did 
not reflect the full costs of the energy enterprises. Overall, the situation had many 
                                                          
1  See e.g. the draft of the Program for Social and Economic Development of Belarus until 2020. 
2  According to plans of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, gas prices will increase by 23% in 2005, by 
11% in 2006, and by 8% in 2007. 
3  The current import price level of about USD 47 per tcm still appears rather favorable. 
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disadvantages. For example, providing direct subsidies meant lower expenditure for social 
needs. Cross-subsidization of households by industry led to severe distortions of financial flows 
and resulted in enterprises having to pay more for energy. Moreover, the widespread practice 
of setting prices so as to realize only modest profits for the state-owned energy companies (for 
example, by undervaluing the costs of assets under inflation) amounted to huge subsidies to 
consumers, which were paid by the state (that is the taxpayers). 
All these problems led to low competitiveness in the gas sector industries of the CEE countries 
and, hence, to limited investment opportunities. This situation could only be changed through 
reforms. Inspired by recent developments within the EU, most CEE countries decided to follow 
a similar reform path. Most important among these were the following measures: 
− Full or partial separation of gas extraction, transportation and distribution (unbundling of 
accounts or creating judicially independent companies); 
− Diversification of gas deliveries; 
− Liberalization of the gas sector; 
− Creation of independent regulatory bodies and improved pricing policies to adequately 
reflect the total energy costs of every enterprise in the gas system; 
− Provision of direct subsidies to poor people; 
− Implementation of pre-restructuring measures for enterprises before privatization; 
− Partial privatization of state enterprises/monopolies, including the gas transport (transit) 
systems and the regional gas distribution companies in the short-term, as well as eventual 
full privatization (however, in most cases the national legislation allows the state to keep a 
controlling block of stock). 
Implementation of these reforms has led to considerable results. CEE gas companies have 
found new foreign investors, which not only brought capital and technologies, but also new 
knowledge, new modes of behavior, a new mentality, transparency of functioning, improved 
reputation, etc. The progress and the different speeds of market gas reforms in different CEE 
countries are outlined in more detail in Appendix 1-2. The experiences with foreign investment 
in Hungary and Slovakia are briefly described in Box 1. 
Box 1. Foreign Investors in Hungary and Slovakia 
Hungary 
Hungary’s integrated oil and gas company MOL has been gradually privatized since 1994 with the 
objective of making it into the Central and Eastern European oil and gas market leader. At present, 9.1% 
and 10% of MOL’s shares, respectively, are held by the Austrian OMV and the Slovak Slovbena & 
Slovintegra, two oil and gas companies, while 54.2% of MOL’s shares are traded on the open market and 
26.7% remain in state ownership, including a ‘golden share’ that enables the state to veto all major 
changes.4 Further strategic partnerships are set up through shareholdings of MOL in INA, the Croatian oil 
and gas group (25%), and the Slovak oil company Slovnaft (70.02%), as well as a partnership 
agreement with TVK, a chemical company and the sole polyolefin producer in Hungary. In 2004, the 
Germany energy company E.on and its subsidiary Ruhrgas started to invest in Hungary’s gas sector. 
Slovakia 
In 2002, 49% of SPP, Slovakia’s former monopoly operator of gas transit and domestic supply was sold in 
equal portions to Ruhrgas and Gas de France for a total amount of USD 2.8 bn. Although while the 
remaining 51% were retained by the state, the Slovakian government committed itself not to intervene in 
SPP’s operational activities and only to exercise control rights. 
3. The gas sector in Belarus 
The gas sector in Belarus is dominated by two state owned concerns, managed and controlled 
by the Ministry of Energy: Beltopgas and Beltransgas. While Beltransgas is responsible for high 
pressure gas transportation within Belarus and for managing gas transit, Beltopgas deals with 
gas distribution and retail sales inside Belarus to final consumers through low pressure 
                                                          
4  For further information (as of September 2003) see www.mol.hu 
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networks5. The Russian company “Gazprom” and some other Russian suppliers sell gas to 
Beltransgas, who then resells it to Beltopgas. Finally, regional distribution companies, 
subsidiaries of “Beltopgas”, sell gas to final consumers (enterprises and households). 
3.1. The Joint Stock Company “Beltransgas” 
The JSC “Beltransgas” was partially corporatized in 2003 with the state holding 99.99% of its 
stock. Beltransgas delivers gas to the Beresovskaya hydroelectric power station and to 
“Beltopgas”. It also provides gas transit services to Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, etc. It is worth 
mentioning that for the last several years the volume of both transit gas and gas for internal 
consumption has been increasing. In addition to its main functions to transit and to transport 
gas, Beltransgas is responsible for the constructions of new trunk and secondary pipelines, 
new gas distribution stations, underground storage facilities, compressor stations, new 
administration facilities, and for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of existing capacities. 
Among the major problems facing the enterprise are depleted assets, payment delays and the 
need for investment. 
Although Beltransgas is a relatively new and modern enterprise, most of its equipment has 
been in service for more than half of its normative life. Even worse, some equipment has been 
operated for more than 33 years. The main source of investment (about USD 60 m annually) is 
a special “amortization fund”. However, although Beltransgas is a corporatized Joint Stock 
Company, its investment decisions are still largely driven by social considerations rather than 
by maximization of profits and thus, shareholder value. In particular, due to the state policy to 
increase the access of rural area to the gas network (so called ‘gasification’ of villages and 
small cities), more than 70% of all investment by “Beltransgas” is spent on unprofitable new 
constructions related to this goal. As a result, the enterprise can spend only 15 to 17% of its 
funds on reconstruction and technical upgrades. In other words, this state enterprise uses 
most of its profit not to increase its efficiency but to meet political objectives. At the same 
time, the government estimates the investment volume for renewing the capital stock, which 
is necessary primarily to insure transit security, as between USD 1 and 2 bn. 
Information about the fee collection rate and the structure of payments for natural gas with 
creditors and debtors is given in table 1. One can see, that the collection rate and payments in 
cash are increasing. Among the reasons explaining this fact, one can point to new 
administrative rules6, as well as to the increasing foreign currency revenues from export: 
increased export brings additional revenues into the country, allowing enterprises to pay for 
consumed gas on time and with cash7. However, the progress is too slow and does not allow 
Belarus to pay old debts of previous years. It worth mentioning that by the end of 2003 the 
Belarusian debt to Russia for gas delivered was about USD 140 m. The new loan of USD 170 
m, which Belarus received from Russia ‘as compensation for the increased price’ can of course 
not solve the problem, but only restructures the existing debt. 
Table 1. The collection rate of the JSC “Beltransgaz” 
and the structure of its accounts payable and receivable 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004, 
9 months 
Payment rate as a % of the total value of 
imported gas deliveries 
121.9 112.2 95.6 108.4 109.5 101.5 
Payment in cash, % 16.3 15.9 3.3 34.5 54.2 87.0 
Payment rate as a % of the total volume of 
the gas delivered to final consumers 
90.8 97.6 94.9 97.5 107.9 99.0 
Cash payments as a % of the total revenue 
from selling gas to final consumers 
62.4 23.3 12.7 22.4 42.0 77.0 
Source: Beltransgaz. 
                                                          
5  The length of the trunk pipelines is 6,931 km. The overall length of all gas pipelines belonging to “Beltransgaz” is 
18,933 km. The gas distribution system consists of over 190 gas distribution stations and gas distribution houses. 
In 2002 Belarus consumed 17.4 bcm and transited 27.5 bcm. The figures for in 2003 were 18.1 and 33.0 bcm, the 
plan for 2004 calls for 18.5 and 33 bcm, and for 2005 for 19.1 and 35 bcm.  
6  Since February 1, 2003, new norms concerning barter in payments for energy resources were set (resolution of the 
Council of Ministers №234 «On Minimal Norms of Cash Payments and Maximum Limits for Non-Cash Payments for 
Gas, Electric and Thermal Energy in 2003»). Almost all gas and electricity consumers must pay 95% of the energy 
resources consumed in cash and on time. Several directors of state enterprises were laid off for failing to meet this 
new requirement. 
7  The currency revenues increased by 43.7% compared to the first half of 2004.  
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3.2. The “Beltopgas” Concern 
The “Beltopgas” Concern consists not only of gas enterprises but of many other businesses as 
well, including some that are not connected with gas at all. In general the concern comprises 
69 enterprises. Among them are 7 big gas enterprises (6 oblgas: one per oblast and 
Minskgas), 32 plants producing peat, 3 enterprises producing gas equipment, and many 
others. Most enterprises, primarily those involved with gas deliveries, are state owned. 
Beltopgas is facing the following problems: 
− Depleted assets and a desperate need for new investment; 
− Delays in payments considerably hamper the financial results of the concern (the main 
non-payers are agricultural enterprises and communal heating enterprises); 
− Preferential prices and the obligation to subsidize certain groups of the consumers, 
although these obligations are not financially supported by the state; 
− ‘Politically’ fixed costs8 make up more than 80% of the concern’s costs. This is possible 
because of Beltopgas’ status as a non-corporatized, state-owned firm with limited 
possibilities for independent, profit-oriented decision-making9. 
3.3. Tariff policy and sector regulation 
Network access 
Until 2004, the conditions for third parties to access the high-pressure network of Beltransgas 
had not been clearly defined. However, in May of 2004 resolution #73 established the tariff for 
gas transportation via the Beltransgas pipeline (USD 8.14 per tcm) with a view to increasing 
the openness and fairness of operations. Yet in practice, only very few companies can 
potentially benefit, since the trunk lines of Beltransgas, carry only high pressure gas, which 
can only be reduced at the gas distributor stations of the Beltopgas system.10 Network access 
to the low-pressure network of Beltopgas by third parties was set at BYR 4000 per 1000 cm 
(without VAT) as of April 1, 2004, and that anywhere within the system. Although it is a 
considerable achievement to have the tariffs for gas transportation clearly defined now, 
numerous administrative barriers for network access by third parties still remain. 
Prices for industrial consumers 
Until 2004, Russia based the price levels for gas supplied to Belarus on its own domestic 
prices. In Russia, natural gas prices had been set at below-cost levels, and cross-financed by 
revenues from exports of gas to Western Europe. Hence, granting the same price to Belarus 
amounted to a subsidy by the Russian gas industry, which was given in return for political and 
economical concessions.11 However, since low and cross-financed domestic energy prices are 
increasingly hampering Russia’s bid to join the WTO, the prices have steadily increased since 
2002. Consequently, the import prices for Belarus registered the same trend (Table 2). Finally, 
Russia refused to grant its domestic prices to Belarus in early 2004, and import prices rose by 
about 25%. 
Once gas is imported into Belarus, its price formation along all stages of the domestic gas 
industry relies on a “cost plus” approach. The Ministry of Economy approves initial prices 
(declarations) in the form of a special document (resolutions “On prices for gas”) in 
coordination with enterprises of the sector, which provide their calculations for prices, costs 
and mark-ups. Through such resolutions the Ministry of Economy sets prices for Beltrangas, 
the Beltopgas enterprises and all preferential consumers. 
Between 2000 and 2002, natural gas mark-ups – especially for Beltopgas – have been reduced 
significantly, mainly cross-financed by additional profits from higher gas transit volumes. Since 
2002, these mark-ups have remained at relatively constant levels; they even increased last 
year. With increasing import prices, efficiency improvements within Beltransgas and Beltopgas 
                                                          
8  We call them politically fixed costs, because they could be reduced if there was no political call for them.  
9  Enterprises cannot reduce the number of employees, as there exists an informal ban; many social objects or 
ancillary businesses cannot be separated, corporatized or privatized, etc. 
10  At present “Beltransgas” sells gas only to the Beresovskaya power station and to “Beltopgas”. 
11  For example, an inter-government agreement provides access by Gazprom to the Belarusian gas sector, in 
particular the transit lines. 
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will be of crucial importance, as they would allow for reducing margins. However, the existing 
cost-plus regulation does not provide incentives for cost reduction and increased efficiency. 
Even worse, a considerable share of the available funds has to be used for politically enforced 
fixed costs and state-prescribed investment programs such as rural ‘gasification’, support of 
peat enterprises, etc. 
Table 2. Price dynamics for gas and its structure 
for industrial enterprises, USD per tcm 



















Purchase price for 
imported gas  
na 30.00 30.00 24.52 33.59 34.37 37.59 46.68 
Markup of 
“Beltransgas” 
na 11.38 11.38 10.03 9.14 6.99 6.92 8.14 
The price of 
“Beltransgas” 
40.50 41.38 41.38 34.55 42.73 41.36 44.51 54.82 
Markup of 
“Beltogas” 
16.30 17.42 15.38 13.38 9.17 9.53 9.43 12.18 
The price of 
“Beltopgas” 
56.8 58.8 56.67 47.93 51.90 50.89 53.94 67.00 
Note: including VAT (20%) 
Source: Beltransgas and Beltopgas 
As for the final consumers (prices for the Beltopgas Concern and eligible enterprises), the 
Ministry of Economy sets a variety of prices. Some enterprises enjoy preferential prices. 
Among them are electricity generation and enterprises of the machinery, chemical, light 
industries12. It should also be stressed that the criteria for and the necessity of setting 
preferential prices are not clearly defined, and that the list of preferential consumers varies 
from resolution to resolution. For example, in 2004 the price for the majority of enterprises 
(including electricity, agriculture, etc.) is USD 67 per tcm. But, simultaneously, the following 
preferential prices exist: 
− for generating power at the Beresovskaya power station, including electricity for export to 
Poland: USD 52 per tcm; 
− for enterprises under the auspices of the Ministry of Sport and Tourism, for plants 
producing peat, peat equipment and peat mining, and for the Novopoloczki plant for 
protein and vitamin concentrates: USD 33.5 per tcm; 
− for two chemical enterprises (“Dolomit” and “GrodnoAsot”): USD 56.9 per tcm; 
− for 18 other enterprises: USD 63.65 per tcm. 
Such a policy of benefiting selected enterprises creates an inefficient allocation and distorts the 
national economy. 
Prices for households 
At the very beginning of the transformation process practically all countries accepted the need 
to cross subside households by industry for reasons of social protection. Over time the 
differences between tariffs (their ratio) changed towards increasing the tariffs for private 
users. Gas cross subsidizing in Belarus was officially abolished in 2003. However, because 
supplying gas to small household consumers is more expensive than to large industrial plants, 
the household tariffs (table 3) are still lower than Beltopgas’ general industrial tariffs (table 2). 
Table 3. Dynamics of the average prices for households for natural gas 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004, 9 months 
Average tariff, USD per tcm 9.2 13.0 27.5 52.8 56.9 
Average cost coverage, %* 30 41 90 150 140 
Source: tariffs – Beltopgas, cost coverage – the Ministry of Economy. 
                                                          
12  One obvious advantage of this could be that the list of beneficiaries is broad but exhaustive.  
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3.4. Resume 
The Belarusian gas sector consists of 2 companies: Beltrangas and the state-owned concern 
Beltopgas. Both enterprises are facing many problems and difficulties, which are mainly the 
consequence of the current regulatory practices. 
As far as price policies are concerned, the prices as such do not appear to be a significant 
problem. Since current household tariffs are considered to cover around 130% of the 
respective costs (Table 3), industry tariffs (Table 2) can be expected to cover an even greater 
share of their costs because the cost to supply gas to industries is lower than to households. 
Although numerous privileges exist for industrial consumers, and despite the social orientation 
of household prices in favor of the rural population, it is unlikely that the tariffs now being 
applied fall short of the reported costs. 
Rather, the Belarusian gas industry suffers from the financial and economic problems 
connected with a general lack of reforms, such as low payment discipline, lack of transparency 
of the financial flows and some payment schemes. Also, both enterprises are overloaded with 
social burdens, and the current practice of cost-plus regulation rewards neither efficiency nor 
elements of competition. On the contrary, any improvement made within the sector was made 
using administrative resources, the capacities of which are not infinite. All these problems can 
be solved only by instituting reforms, aimed at demonopolization, commercialization and 
corporatization of the sector. 
4. Directions for reforms and gas sector restructuring 
As noted in the previous sections, the opportunity to benefit from the very low import prices 
during the years 2002 and 2003 was not grasped adequately for purposes of maintenance and 
investment in infrastructure. Instead, some investments went into non-core business activities 
(in part socially motivated), and others were simply ‘stashed’ away within an inefficient 
structure that does not reward initiative or efficiency. 
One the one hand, the crucial importance of gas for the Belarusian economy requires having 
gas prices as low as possible. On the other hand, the huge need for investments in 
infrastructure and equipment should – at least partly – be financed by private investors, since 
public funds are limited and are also needed for investments in the social sphere such as in 
health care, education, etc. Hence, gas industry policy should be directed towards sustainable, 
profit-oriented development. Reform of the sector will only be successful once it creates an 
environment encouraging more efficient enterprises. The enterprises themselves should attract 
consumers by offering the best “price-quality” ratio. Obviously already existing enterprises 
might have advantages over new firms. But these advantages (in particular the already 
existing infrastructure) must be used in favor of an overall development of the sector (e.g. by 
guaranteeing access to this infrastructure at equal prices), and not as an obstacle to 
competition. In any case, consumers or investors rather than the state should decide the 
advisability of an investment project or the creation of a new firm. 
Against this background, we recommend to develop the following policies: 
− Provide incentives for efficiency increases in the gas sector; 
− Create attractive investment opportunities for the private sector; 
− Do not require privatization of the state-owned enterprises within Beltransgas and 
Beltopgas. 
In this regard the following steps could be taken: 
A. Price reform 
The first and easiest reform concerns the pricing policy, which should be redefined for both, 
Beltrangas and Beltopgas (final consumers) based on the following principles: 
− Tariffs for final consumers must be set on cost-based levels for households and for 
industries without allowing for cross subsidization13; 
                                                          
13  Although cross-subsidization of households by industry does not exist any more, Belarusian policy makers are still 
considering it a useful strategy, as the reintroduction of cross-subsidization in the electricity sector demonstrates. 
Hence, a similar step for the gas sector cannot be ruled out at the moment. 
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− Cost levels must include for the accumulation of funds for investments; 
− The prices for all industrial consumers must be equal. 
Missing meters14 for gas consumption must not be considered an obstacle for reform 
development. Rather, any effort towards improving the pricing policies must provide for 
investment funds for installing gas meters. This will not only allow for exact billings based on 
actual consumption, it will also give consumers incentives to reduce consumption and thereby 
reduce their dependency on gas. After meters are installed, anybody can easily determine how 
much gas he used, and “Beltopgas” can clearly say how much it has cost them to supply this 
gas. Establishing cost-covering tariffs on this basis will be transparent and clear. 
At the same time, support for poor households must be provided by the state, or temporarily 
through lifeline schemes, where prices for consumption up to a ‘minimum’ threshold are 
subsidized by higher prices for consumption in excess of this threshold. 
Simultaneously, the work on improving payment discipline must be continued with all groups 
of consumers, using economic as well as administrative measures without any exemptions. 
Finally, the practice of using the proceeds from international gas transit to finance the 
domestic gas supply should be stopped. Instead: 
− Cost-covering tariffs within the domestic gas sector should replace cross-subsidies; 
− The revenues from the international transit should be used to cover all transit costs and to 
finance approved investment programs to maintain and expand the existing transit 
infrastructure; 
− Excess revenues, which are not used to cover costs and investments, should be transferred 
to the state. There they can be used to finance social targets related to the gas sector such 
as gasification of rural areas or direct support to the poorest households to compensate for 
the increased gas tariffs. 
B. Restructuring and corporatizing enterprises within the “Beltopgas” system 
Just like with any other business, corporatization of “Beltopgas” and “Beltransgas” should aim 
at creating independent companies with the right to make independent decisions concerning 
production, investments and structural changes. The management of each company must be 
imbedded in a mix of incentives and obligations in order to ensure that their decisions are 
driven by the maximization of operating profits and thus, shareholder value. In turn, the 
shareholders (in this case the state) retain a control function over the management to ensure 
that it is acting so as to maximize shareholder value. Only in this way can corporatization 
create enterprises that continuously seek to improve performance and efficiency. 
Against this benchmark “Beltopgas” and “Beltransgas” still need significant restructuring. Both 
enterprises are overburdened with non-productive assets, and (although in part already 
officially corporatized) they are not yet free to make decisions about how to make and spend 
money and where to invest. Together with the introduction of the new pricing policy discussed 
above, the current practice of forcing investment funds to be used for social purposes has to 
be stopped. Restructuring and corporatization also includes the necessity and the possibility to 
divest all ancillary enterprises that are not related to the core business. Social burdens and 
politically fixed costs may not allow considering these enterprises as real ‘businesses’. Instead, 
numerous social objects, which are now parts of these enterprises, must be restructured, 
separated, sold or transferred to the responsibilities of municipal authorities. Full 
corporatization must free enterprises from such politically enforced expenditures. In addition to 
reducing costs and limiting the spheres of responsibility, corporatization will create new 
systems of incentives and motivation. 
To avoid cross-subsidization between different activities within a single firm (a particularly 
severe impediment for the development of competition within the different activities), full 
corporatization must include a strict separation (unbundeling) of network operations and gas 
                                                          
14  As metered consumption costs considerably less than norm consumption today, one could say that there should be 
an incentive for houses/apartments to have meters installed. But the cost of installing meters is rather high and 
should not be borne by consumers only. Part of the installation costs could be recuperated by charging rents for 
meters; another part could be financed with the help of international donors who support such efforts. 
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supply (retail) activities within each company, and for the case of Beltransgas also a 
separation into international transit and domestic transmission. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure credibility of the corporatization, all companies should provide a sufficient degree of 
transparency, e.g. through regular independent audits according to international standards. 
C. Implementation of “regulated competition” 
In order to avoid any type of interference, the sector needs a regulator independent from both, 
the gas business and the government. This body should set “the rules of the game”, taking 
into consideration the interests of all groups involved. Among its first actions the regulator 
should make changes to the tariff policy that will bring more competition to the sector. 
First of all, the regulator needs to set tariffs for access to the high-pressure network. This 
would allow not only the network operator (“Beltransgas”) but also any other company with 
the necessary technical qualifications to access the network at the same price. The regulator 
should not set prices for final consumers of the high-pressure network, which should be 
determined by competition (all providers pay the same access tariff to the network, but 
compete by having different prices for their own gas purchases, retailing activities etc.). The 
companies having access to the high-pressure network need to be corporatized to ensure that 
they have incentives to take the economically most attractive offer. Successful unbundling will 
then have ruled out possibilities for cross-subsidization, and having independent audits will 
identify those operative decisions that do not contribute to the goal of profit maximization. 
The number of actors that are able to benefit from such ‘regulated competition’ is rather 
limited at the present time. However, even when competitive forces will (or can) not unfold 
immediately, our reform proposals still improve the current situation by eliminating non-
transparent transactions and cross subsidization in the short run. Over the medium and long 
term, entries of new gas traders are likely since the new regulation structure will provide 
transparent conditions and competitive rewards. Once these structural changes are in place, 
the high-pressure network will become more attractive to private investments, which can take 
the following forms: 
− Corporate bonds: These are flexible but expensive instruments, and therefore only suited 
for short-term financing. 
− Loan agreements with domestic and international banks and finance institutions (e.g. 
EBRD): These are well suited to long-term agreements. The proposed scheme of ‘regulated 
competition’ would form the basis for satisfying the conditionality criteria, especially for 
international loans. 
− Public-Private Partnerships: They could take the form of management contracts or 
operating concessions for (separable parts of) “Beltransgas” by private entities. This would 
allow utilizing the efficiency potential of the private sector without privatization. 
Finally, once ‘regulated competition’ works for the high-pressure segment it should gradually 
be expanded to the low-pressure network of “Beltopgas” as well. 
In addition to providing a sustainable solution to the problems of the domestic gas industry 
without relying on outside support, the proposed reforms of the domestic gas sector will also 
increase Belarus’ credibility as a reliable transit partner. In particular, it will demonstrate the 
good intentions of the government to solve the major problems of its domestic gas industry 
without requesting subsidized prices or using the gas transit activities for cross-financing a 
loss-making domestic industry, as in the past. In this way, the proposed reform program 
would also contribute significantly to improve the chances of Belarus to benefit more from 
international gas transit. 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Gas plays a very important role within the Belarusian economy. Up to now Belarus has been 
subsidized by Russia, yet all the potential opportunities arising from the cheap import prices 
have been spent mostly on social projects and preferential pricing for selected consumers. The 
unavoidable future price increases will lead to painful consequences for some consumers and 
to difficult choices in general. But the industry’s problems of adjusting to the new gas price 
reality could be eased by reducing costs inside the gas sector and increasing efficiency. This in 
turn requires investments and reforms. Experience throughout the EU and the CEE shows that 
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the best solution for making the sector more attractive for new investment is to implement 
transparent and competition-oriented regulatory policies. 
In order to open the sector to new investments some restructuring and corporatization 
measures must be implemented. If an enterprise is overburdened with unproductive assets 
and is not free to spend its revenues and invest profits, it operates in the same manner as a 
state enterprise, using the same sources of investment, namely the Ministry of Finance’s 
money. Under these conditions, managers are not motivated to promote cost reduction and 
increase efficiency. Therefore we recommend full corporatization of all gas enterprises and 
deep restructuring of the whole sector, with a view to dedicate management to maximize 
shareholder value (the state being and remaining the main share holder). 
The required regulatory changes have two aspects. First of all, in order to achieve cost and 
profit transparency the sector needs to implement a new price policy which bases the tariffs for 
the final consumers on cost-based levels (which of course must include some profit). This 
principle must apply equally to both households and industries without any cross subsidization. 
Secondly, “regulated competition” should gradually change the current “cost plus” approach. 
To avoid any type of outside interference, this definitely requires an independent regulator. 
Among the first actions of such a regulator we suggest that tariff policy changes be 
implemented that will bring more competition to the sector. 
All these short-term reforms will lead to a more reliable, profitable and efficient performance in 
the gas sector in Belarus, while at the same time increasing the reputation of Belarus as a 
predictable transit country. 
 
Authors: Elena Rakova, Ferdinand Pavel 
Lecturer Igor Pelipas 
Minsk, December 2004 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Comparative review of natural gas policies in Central Europe, 1H 2002 












Name of the regulator and when 
established. Competition in the sector 
Privatization of the main gas 
company, ownership 
Slovakia  110 100 Regulatory Office of Network 
Industries, 2001. RONI regulates 
tariffs. In 2001 the Ministry of 
Economy published a decree allowing 
the largest eligible customers to 
choose their suppliers. 
The integrated gas company 
SPP was partly privatized in 
2002 (a consortium made 
up of Ruhrgas, Gas de 
France and Gazprom have 
paid USD 2.7 bn for 45%) 
Czech 
Republic  
230 150 Energy Regulatory Office, 2001. ERO 
sets natural gas prices. It regulates 
the maximum price Transgas can 
charge the distribution companies for 
wholesale gas purchases and the 
maximum price at which the 
distribution companies sell gas to 
their end customers. The Czech 
Republic is phasing in competition for 
the largest, eligible consumers in 
order to meet EU regulations so that 
at least 28% of the annual gas 
consumption will be met through 
retail competition and not through 
regulated distribution. 
The integrated gas company 
Transgas was privatized in 
2002. The German firm RWE 
purchased 97% of Transgas 
and 46 to 58% stakes in 
eight regional gas 
distribution companies for 
$3.7 bn. 
Poland 300 160 Energy Regulatory Authority (URE), 
1997. URE sets natural gas tariffs for 
domestic consumers. PGNiG has 
suffered losses because tariffs do not 
fully cover costs, particularly for 
residential consumers. In 2001, the 
Ministry of Economy adopted a new 
formula for calculating gas tariffs, 
which is designed to eventually allow 
for full cost recovery. 
The Polish Oil and Gas 
Company (PGNiG) is an 
integrated, state-owned oil 
and gas monopoly. 
Hungary  180 160 Hungarian Energy Office (MEH), 1994. 
The Hungarian Energy Office regulates 
prices and issues licenses in the gas 
sector.  
MOL, the Hungarian oil and 
gas company, was 
privatized in several stages 
beginning in 1993, through 
share offerings to 
employees and 
management, initial public 
offerings on the Budapest 
stock exchange and 
international private 
placements to institutional 
investors. Currently, 
international investors hold 
52.1% of the company, 
various domestic investors 
own 22.9% and the State 
Property Fund retains 25%. 
Bulgaria 145  State Energy Regulatory Commission 
(SERC) is an independent specialized 
state body whose members are 
elected by the Council of Ministers 
and appointed by the Prime Minister. 
SERC’s competence is related to 
Bulgargas is a state owned 
vertically integrated 
company who is the only 
supplier to consumers and 
gas distribution companies 
in Bulgaria (gas sales are 
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issuing and withdrawing permits and 
licenses; regulating prices and tariffs; 
developing and proposing for adoption 
by the Council of Ministers of 
secondary legislation concerning the 
order and conditions for issuing 
permits and licenses and determining 
the rules for setting electricity, heat 
and natural gas prices. SERC 
determines the rate of return of the 
gas companies’ capital – 8% for the 
transmission company and 15% for 
the gas distribution companies. 
97%) and owner of 
transmission systems, 
underground storage, and 
also a part of the 
distribution system. By the 
end of 2006 the monopoly is 
intended to end, following a 
restructuring and dividing 
Bulgargas into several joint 
stock companies for import, 
transit, storage, and 
distribution.  
Romania 130 110 National Natural Gas Regulatory Au-
thority, 2000. ANRGN regulates the 
natural gas sector. Responsibilities 
include tariff setting, authorizing and 
licensing companies, protecting con-
sumers, controlling the natural gas 
sector companies, issuing technical 
norms, and regulating access to the 
transmission and distribution grids. 
In 2000 the state monopoly 
ROMGAZ. S.A. was split into 
five independent companies, 
all 100% state-owned, as 
follows: DISTRIGAZ SUD 
Bucuresti – responsible for 
supply and gas distribution, 
DISTRIGAZ NORD Targu-
Mures – for supply and gas 
distribution, EXPROGAZ Me-
dias – responsible for gas 
production and underground 
storage, DEPOGAZ Ploiesti – 
responsible for underground 
storage, TRANSGAS MEDIAS 
– in charge of gas transmis-
sion and transit. 
In 2001, EXPROGAZ and 
DEPOGAZ were merged into 
a single entity called 
S.N.G.N. ROMGAZ. S.A., 
having as its main activities 
exploration, production and 
underground storage.  
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Internet sources 
 




Gas Distribution Gas Storage 
Slovakia 49% privately held 15 
Czech      
Republic 
97% privately held; some independent gas distribution16 
Poland 100% state owned (except transit is partially owned by a subsidiary) 
Hungary 75% privately held 
Bulgaria 100% state owned 3% privately held 100% state owned 
Romania 35% privately held 
(three production 
companies) 
100% state owned 40% privately held 
(20 distribution 
companies) 
100% state owned 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 
                                                          
15  Natural gas storage in Slovakia is owned by a private company, Nafta Gbely. SPP owns 51% of this company. 
16  All the major distribution companies are partially or majority owned by RWE, which also owns Transgas. One small 
distribution company is not part of this group. 
